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ABSTRACT 
 
The present thesis describes the complexity of the water and sanitation sector, its 
particularities in Colombia and the various forms on which corruption takes place 
from policy making to payment for services. The argument advanced in this study is 
that corruption in the Colombian water and sanitation sector occurs along the whole 
collusion chain in a cascading process. This thesis identifies the structure and loci of 
corruption, explains how its operations, and how government may possibly intervene 
in its abatement. The thesis argues that the people in rural area in Colombia suffers 
from the lack of access to water and sanitation service, not primarily because of  the 
government underinvestment in the sector scarce financial resources but more 
importantly largely because of the evaporation of the money through embezzlement 
and mismanagement.  
In order to control this debilitative condition, it is important that policy makers 
understand the loci of corruption in the political economy of water and sanitation and 
intervene strategically in the corrupt chain that devours public resources. Unless this 
maligned state is contained, the Colombian people, especially those in the rural area, 
would continue to suffer from the lack of access to quality water and sanitation 
services.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Transparency International (2008) defines corruption as the abuse of entrusted 
power for private gain. In reality, corruption is much worse than what the word 
―abuse‖ imparts. It is disease that plagues everything that surrounds it. It maims a 
democratic system of government, it betrays people s´ trust in their institutions, and it 
robs people of their motivation to participate in self-governance. Economically, 
corruption distorts the market as it subverts fair competition and robs the resources 
that are badly needed for national development, let alone the elimination of poverty.  
There is more. Corruption widens the gap between the rich and the poor--in two 
fundamental ways: first, the perpetrators are usually wealthy elites, and corruption 
makes them richer. Second, the money intended for the poor never reaches them. 
So the corrupt regime heightens the relative deprivation of the have-nots. As a 
debilitating disease, corruption jumps from one place to another searching for a safe 
haven that grows it and feeds the insatiable appetite its perpetrators. There is no 
place to better explain this sad condition than in water and sanitation service. 
Historically, this sector has been a cradle for corruption because the supply and 
demand process is complex, which involves multiple stakeholders with elusive 
pecuniary ambitions. The water and sanitation service is also a fertile ground for 
corruption because of its monopolistic characteristics, as well as a vast amount of 
money it handles. These characteristics conduce to a perfect environment for bribing, 
stealing, and kickbacks, and many others corrupt activities. Due to the prevalence of 
these unsavory practices, the already limited financial resources fade away, just as 
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the water does in a leaking pipeline. To date, according to Transparency International 
(2008), worldwide, 1.2 billion people are denied access to water service, and 2.6 
billion don t´ even have proper sanitation facilities, all owing largely to corrupt 
practices.  
In Colombia, which is the focus of this thesis, the corruption in the water service 
and sanitation industry follows basically the same pattern observed worldwide.  The 
government of Colombia has invested a large sum of money, $7.5 billion, from 1993 
to 2006, for the development of the water and sanitation service, but according to 
Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos Domiciliarios (2007), many in rural areas still 
do not have access to water and sanitation service. Experts believe that the money 
allocated for the industry was sufficient to build a comprehensive water and 
sanitation system. Silvia (2005), for instance, argue that the money could provide the 
people in rural areas 100% access to water supply and 95% access to sewerage 
service. Unfortunately, the access at the end of 2006 was estimated only at 88% for 
water and 78% for sanitation, respectively (Silva 2005). These statistics confirm a 
widespread suspicion that a significant part of the resources allocated to the water 
and sanitation service might have been evaporated in the complex chain of 
corruption in the supply and demand process.  
Literature abounds that the leakage of the funds allocated to the water and 
sanitation service occurs through a complex system of middlemen and contracts. 
This allows me to hypothesize that the public resources available in the water and 
sanitation service in Colombia would dissipate incrementally at every step in the 
cascading supply-and-demand process (I show this in Section IV). If this hypothesis 
is true, the Colombian people would continue to suffer from the lack of access to 
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quality water and sanitation services—sadly, not because of public resources, but 
because of the corruption network.  
 
It is important that the government of Colombia stop the leakage as quickly as 
possible and channel its resources to the construction and delivery of water and 
sanitation service to the people, especially those in rural areas. To do this, however, 
policy makers must understand the underlying structure of corruption and identify 
where the resources are leaking and how. Were they to control this maligned 
practice, policy makers must identify the locus of corruption in the political economy 
of water and sanitation and scrutinize how the budgetary resources are evaporating 
at each leakage point in the cascading corrupt chain.  
 
The purpose of this study is to identify the potential sources of leakage in the 
water and sanitation service in Colombia and provide examples that elucidate the 
dissipation of the public fund for infrastructure development. To complete this study I 
first draw upon the literature on the corruption of the water and sanitation sector 
across nations, then the field observation that I have garnered while working in the 
water and sanitation sector in Colombia for the past seven years. 
The central thrust of my effort in the study is to disentangle the complexity of 
corruption in the water and sanitation service sector, thereby to establish an 
empirically testable collusive chain. My objective in this thesis is to identify the 
stakeholders (potential perpetrators) involved in each link, their collusive relationship, 
and the potential corrupt practices. To add strength to this hypothesis, I, first, build a 
model of the corruption regime in Colombia‘s water and sanitation sector based on 
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general literature, then explain how embezzlement and mismanagement of the 
budgetary resources take place at each step in the process.  
 
The presentation of this study will begin with a brief definition of corruption; this 
will be followed by a description of the water and sanitation sector and its 
particularities in Colombia, including the decision making chain from policymaking to 
construction at the local level. 
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II. Corruption: Concepts and Definitions 
 
 
The purpose of this section is to overview industry literature as it relates to the water 
and sanitation corruption. The overview will focus on the drivers and consequences 
of corruption indentifying the cost that this practice represents for the society. Finally 
I will have an outline of the corruption in the water and sanitation sector, based on 
previous researches associated with the topic, explaining some punctual forms in 
which corruption takes place. 
Corruption comes in many shapes and color, but since I am dealing with public 
service, I am borrowing the concept from Transparency International (2009):  
corruption is the abuse of entrusted power for private gain, which means having 
personal interests above those of the people and ideals the person is pledged to. 
This definition can be complemented with the definition given by Joseph Nye (1967) 
who thinks it as a behavior that deviates from the normal duties of a public role 
because of private, pecuniary or status gain, or violates rules against the exercise of 
private-regarding influence. Corrupt acts can be committed directly or indirectly, with 
any other group or body, which can be public or private and for the benefit of the 
perpetrator, or some other party. Official misconduct would include behavior such as 
fraud, theft, embezzlement (appropriating assets by individuals to whom such assets 
have been entrusted), perverting the course of justice, bribery (use of reward to 
prevent the judgment of a person in a position of trust); nepotism (appointing 
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someone due to relationship rather than merit); misuse of policy instruments (making 
public policies in favor of certain group) and misappropriation (illegal appropriation of 
public resources for private use). These malpractices among others deteriorate any 
field of the public administration where they find place to settle. Figure 1 shows some 
of the most common forms of corruption  
 
Figure 1: Forms of corruption (WB 2010) 
 
 
A. Causes of corruption, the Drivers  
 
Corruption or corruptive act requires at least  two parties just as tango requires 
two ; it is not an one-dimensional problem; it encompasses a range of interactions 
between and among interested parties in society, each with its own dynamic (WB 
2010). Corruption can occur in private firms or in the public service. However, the 
attention in this study is focused on the public sector. Corruption in private 
enterprises relate to the ineffective control established in the organization. 
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Corruption in the public sector, however, is much more diffused, hence more difficult 
to deal with.  
In fact, having two parties is not the only condition needed to have a corrupt act; 
there must be intent in the mind of the perpetrator, which can be motivated by 
different causes like not having cultural and moral values, having personal financial 
problems, being in an ―everyone else does it‖ environment, being exposed to 
external pressure or having ideological driving forces to commit the perverse act 
(Campos 2007). The second basic condition surrounding every act of corruption is 
the opportunity, which is the set of characteristics that form the perfect environment 
for a perpetrator (Jones 2004), who previously has the intention to commit the 
corrupted act. Opportunities can arise from almost any conditions and people with 
bad intentions are waiting for them; sooner or later the opportunity will appear and 
there is where the last condition emerges; it is the accountability: the 
acknowledgment and assumption of responsibility for actions, decisions, and policies 
where the individual has obligation to report, explain and be answerable for resulting 
consequences (Jones 2004), in other words it represents the fear of the perpetrator 
of getting caught after committing a corrupted act. Then these three forces: Intent, 
opportunity and lack of accountability form a triangle that determines the possibility 
of having or not a corrupted act. For example, if there is no intent to commit these 
kind of practice and there exist the opportunity of doing it and low chance of being 
caught, there will not be any misconduct. Figure 2 presents the triangle of corruption, 
with some hypothetical combinations of the factors; here the greater the area of the 
triangle,  the higher the probability of a corrupt act.  
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Figure 2. Triangle of Corruption 
 
 
B. Cost of corruption, the Consequences  
 
Corruption impacts people's lives in many ways. In the worst case, corruption costs 
lives. In some other cases, it costs their freedom, health, or money. It has terrible 
consequences, trapping millions in poverty and misery, while breeding social, 
economic and political unrest. Corruption is both a cause of poverty, and a barrier to 
overcoming it. Here are a few examples. Let‘s try to analyze how corruption charges 
its fee to the society. First, corruption goes against the fundamental human right to 
fair treatment; all persons are supposed to be treated equally, and when one person 
gives a bribe to a public official he or she buys a privileged status in relation to others. 
He becomes an ‗first-category citizen‘ while others are ‗second-category citizens‘ and 
the less money you give –or you have to give- as a bribe the deeper you go on this 
evil ―categorization‖ – and it comes to our mind the position of the very poor people, 
women, ethnic minorities, or refugees. Evans (1999) characterizes corruption as 
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―profoundly inegalitarian in its effects - it has a ‗Robin Hood-in-reverse‘ character. In 
the same vein, Bayley (1998) characterizes bribery as ―a direct transfer of money 
from the poor to the rich‖ (cited in Evans, 2000). Furthermore, corruption makes the 
public decision-making process to be biased, due to prevalence of personal 
enrichment over the establishment of welfare for all. Therefore, government 
expenditures will be prioritized according to opportunities of getting bribes or political 
gains rather than on the basis of public well-being, which ends affecting the poor 
more than the rich. 
 
According to Transparency international (2010), the cost of corruption has three 
dimensions: political, economic and social. Politically, corruption is a major obstacle 
to the road to democracy and the rule of law. When government institutions are 
caught in corruption scandals, they lose their legitimacy. Economically, corruption 
leads to the diminution of national wealth. It is often responsible for the allocation of 
scarce resources to uneconomic high-profile projects, such as building dams, power 
plants, pipelines and refineries that are not needed in the first place. As the scarce 
resources were diverted to elsewhere, the government has no resources to   invest 
in primary infrastructure projects such as schools, hospitals and roads, or the supply 
of power and water to rural areas. Furthermore, it impedes the development of 
market structures and distorts competition, diminishing investments in the country 
and economic growth. In the social field, corruption reduces people's trust in the 
political system, in its institutions and in their governors. Distrust form this 
disappointed citizens result in a weak civil society. The corruption becomes the law in 
the country and those who do not tolerate it have to escape from the country 
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depriving it from the most honest and sometimes best qualified citizens. 
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III. Corruption in the Water and Sanitation Sector 
 
Water is the basic natural resource for our existence. It is indispensable for human 
survival. In larger perspective, it is sine qua non for national development. Without 
water, it is not possible to achieve economic growth, obtain industrialization and 
enjoy hydropower. Improving water related institutions and investing in infrastructure 
is the same as investing in health, jobs creation, education, gender equality, work 
efficiency, environmental preservation and infant mortality reduction. Unfortunately, 
corruption negates these efforts. Corruption in the WSS keeps the poor to remain in 
poverty and makes humanity projects such as the United Nations‘ Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG) impossible to achieve. According to Water Integrity 
Network (2010), there is no other area where corruption directly and profoundly 
affects the lives and livelihoods of billions of people as in the provision of water.  
 
Corruption can be found at every step in the WSS value chain: from policy 
design and budget allocations to operations and billing systems. Corruption affects 
both private and public water services and it is not exclusive illness of poor 
economies. In wealthier countries, corruption is present in the awarding of contracts 
for building and operating water facilities and infrastructure. According to 
Transparency International (2008), corruption in the WSS worth an estimated of 
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US$210 billion annually in Western Europe, North America and Japan. In developing 
countries, corruption is estimated to raise the price for connecting a household to a 
water network by as much as 30 per cent.  
 
It is reasonable to ask why policy makers find it difficult to eliminate the root and 
branch of corruption in water and sanitation service. As I have alluded earlier, the 
scale and depth of corruption in water and sanitation service is truly complex. First of 
all, the governance of water cuts across many jurisdictions. As a result, it defies legal 
and institutional classification creating a regulatory lacuna and leaving governance 
dispersed and fragmented across different countries and different agencies, which 
creates an intractable array of loopholes that perpetrators can exploit with impunity. 
What is worse, most countries approach water management largely as a technical 
issue and an engineering challenge. What is really needed is to conceptualize the 
management of water essentially as a political, economic, and social issue.  
Water management involves large flows of public money. It is much more capital 
intensive than the management of other utilities. Large water management, irrigation 
and dam projects are complex and difficult to standardize, making procurement 
lucrative and manipulation difficult to detect. 
Private investment in water management is growing in countries. So is the risk 
for high corruption. Nine of the ten major growth markets for private sector 
participation in water and sanitation are in countries with high risks of corruption, 
posing particular challenges for international investors (Water Integrity Network 
2010). 
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Informal providers, often vulnerable to corruption, continue to play a key role in 
delivering water to the poor: Informal water providers provide important bridging 
functions in many developing countries to bring water to the poor. They often operate 
in a legal grey zone, however, making their operations vulnerable to extortion and 
bribery. 
Corruption in water most affects those with the weakest voice: Corruption in 
water often affects marginalized communities, the poor or – in the case of its impact 
on the environment – future generations. These are all stakeholders with a weak 
voice and limited ability to demand more accountability. 
 
As a result of these especial features, we can see how the money allocated to 
improve the water and sanitation services, mainly for the poorest part of the 
population, evaporates through embezzlement and mismanagement, leading to an 
awful scenario with the consequences already explained..  
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IV.  Literature Review 
A. Patterns of Corruption in the Water Service Delivery Process  
 
Davis (2004) shows the frequent payments done to obtain the service, and the bribes 
given to junior staff of public W&S agencies by household members. These 
payments were made in order to speed up applications for new connections; quicker 
attention to water supply and sewer repair works; the falsification of water bills; and 
the provision or ignoring of illegal service connections. According to Davis (2004) 
field research, it appears that customers who were unwilling or unable to pay cash 
for rapid attention to their W&S service problems were supposed to pay with their 
time. Finally the mentioned author divides the corruption in the water and sanitation 
sector in two stages, which are explained in the next lines.  
 
1. Corruption in Contracting Out 
To describe the corruption that takes place in this step of the chain, Davis (2004) 
interviewed field staff and they pointed to the procedures by which professional 
engineering staff award and implement construction contracts with private firms. Two 
processes operate to weak fair and honest contracting in WSS: contractor cartels 
and political influence in contractor selection. Although almost all water companies 
have some form of competitive bidding; contractor cartels are always operating. 
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Cartels subvert the goals of competitive bidding by deciding the outcome of such 
processes ex ante among their members; to do so, a group of contractors decide 
who is going to win which contract for an especial water company; this person sets 
the price that he will bid for that contract and everyone else bids a lower price. In this 
way the real price of the contract goes up letting enjoy a ―surplus‖ that partly goes to 
pay other contractors for their cooperation in the process.   
 
2. Corruption after Awarding the Contract  
While the contract is taking place, there are two possible ways of committing corrupt 
acts, both of them with the complicity of the agency in charge of the contract. The 
first is the use of substandard materials, which means that the contractor is 
employing materials that have the same utility but with a lower quality, so at first sight 
they appear to fulfill their mission and may let the whole facility being workable but 
not at the whole capacity or during the design term. The second one is the falsified 
invoicing in materials, This practice is common in many infrastructure projects that 
cannot be checked after the construction, for example the buried pipelines, where 
the agency staff approves a bill for a higher amount of work than the one that was 
done.  
 
 
B. Corruption identification and control experience in the WSS in 
Colombia  
 
Private Sector Anti-Corruption Agreement in the Pipe Manufacturing Industry (Water 
Integrity Network, 2008): 
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In Colombia, the procurement of pipes for water supply and infrastructure has been 
vulnerable to corruption and fraud. The conditions established to participate in the 
tendering process often tend to favour single bidders, without consideration for the 
technical analysis justifying given requirements. Moreover, the bribes are frequently 
offered in the contracting processes. These practices resulted in the loss of large 
sum of public resources for water and infrastructure projects.  
 
In 2004, the Colombian Sanitary and Environmental Engineering Association and 
Transparency International Colombia, established a sectorial Anti-Bribery Agreement, 
In order to reduce the mistrust and lack of credibility ruling the pipe manufacturing 
industry. Pipe manufacturing companies (95% of the companies) signed an Anti-
Bribery Agreement in April 2005, stipulating that each company was going to 
introduce a general anticorruption program as specified in Transparency 
Internationals‘ Business Principles to Counteract Bribery (BPCB), establishing 
corruption control programs in: pricing and purchasing, distribution and sales 
schemes, implementation mechanisms, internal controls and audits, HRM, 
communications, as well as the protection of ‗whistle blowers‘.  
 
As mentioned in the study case (WIN 2010) the main reasons that allow corruption to 
find a niche in the WSS and the strategies to control them were:    
Lack of an Anti-corruption Corporate Culture 
 Offer employee training on the Agreement‗s content 
 Provide Human Resource Management (Addendums to labor contracts; 
Induction processes) 
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 Establish clear reporting lines for general managers and treasures 
 Boards of Directors need to formally support the Agreement Absence of 
Internal Ethical Standards 
 Establish detailed guidelines and disseminate Agreement widely 
 Hold regional meetings to launch the Agreement (Corporate image for 
Agreement; Meetings with public officers; National media publications) 
 
Lack of Transparency in Contracting 
 The Agreement establishes new rules that go beyond legal statutes 
 The Agreement encourages the public sector to establish similar guidelines 
 The Agreement creates pressure for other suppliers to join the Agreement 
 
Tolerance of Bribery Practices in the Distribution Scheme 
 Offer regional Agreement training sessions with distributors 
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V. Structural Conditions for Corruption in Colombia’s Water and 
Sanitation Service 
 
After understanding the causes and the consequences of the corruption in the WSS 
and learning form international experiences a possible way of understanding the 
corruption chain in the WSS sector, I will describe the corrupt actions that can be 
committed along the collusive chain in the WSS in Colombia. For this purpose I will 
base the framework in the Value Chain Structure proposed by Plummer and Cross 
(2006) which divides all the activities involved in the sector in different stages. 
Afterwards, the possible actions for each stage will be identified. It should be clarified 
that the corruption scenarios mentioned are just potential scenarios and they don‘t 
compromise any of the institutions that will be mentioned as responsible for the 
countermeasures; the cases are mentioned based on the literature, personal 
experience and perception of the author. 
 
Before discussing the possible sources of corruption in the study case, and in 
order to make clear the context of the sector which will be analyzed, I will present a 
general idea of the structure of the water and sanitation sector in Colombia. 
 
C. Current Conditions of the Provision of the Water and Sanitation 
Services in Colombia 
Over the last 15 years, Colombia has gone through an important change in the water 
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supply and sanitation sector. Between 1990 and 2004, average access to water and 
sanitation services increased from 82% to 86% and 92% to 93% respectively 
(UNICEF 2006). In 1994 public services reform was introduced with the purpose of 
increasing water and sanitation investments through transfers of resources and 
responsibilities to municipalities form the central government, trying to improve 
service quality and efficiency by i) Promoting private sector participation in those 
parts of the country where the profits were not enough for attracting private 
investment, ii) Establishing a regulatory agency at the national level, in charge of 
guaranteeing the quality of the service with a fair tariff that would aloud the cost-
recovery for the investors and iii) Aiding the users with less income through a cross-
subsidies strategy in the form of neighborhood-based tariff. The result of this reform 
is that in the present 99% of the population living in the urban zone has access to 
water and 96% to sanitation services. On the other hand the rural zone does not 
have the same conditions and barely reach 70% on the service coverage (SSPD 
2007).   
The structure of the sector in Colombia involves different stakeholders with a 
common goal which is providing water and sanitation services to the population with 
the expected quality and a fair price; in this way, the responsibilities are divided in 
the following manner ( The following description as well as other characterizations 
that will be done in this paper are partially based on my own experience and my field 
observations of the water and sanitation sector in Colombia, considering that I have 
worked on the sector for more than 7 years) 
Policy Making and regulation duties are the responsibility of The Vice-Ministry of 
Water and Sanitation is in charge of defining the sector policy which follows the 
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national policy established by National Planning Department in the Development 
National Plan done by every president. 
Responsibility for regulating these services is shared by two institutions at the 
national level. The Potable Water and Basic Sanitation Regulatory Commission sets 
the criteria for efficient service provision and sets the rules for tariff revision and the 
Superintendency for Residential Public Services, is in charge of controlling the 
application of the rules given for the sector. However, none of these agencies are 
responsible for corruption control. This issue is handled directly by the Attorney 
General s´ Office and Public Prosecutor s´ Office 
Additionally, the environmental authorities are in charge of controlling and 
monitoring the impact of the waste water on the environment as well as giving the 
permissions for taking the natural resource out from the sources. However, the 
service provision is responsibility of Municipalities, with the assistance of 
Departments, both of which are responsible for ensuring that services are provided in 
an efficient way, which doesn t´ mean that they are responsible for its provision; in 
effect just under certain circumstances municipalities can directly provide the 
services. The public utilities operators, that can be public, private or both, are those 
in charge of supplying the services of water and sanitation.  
In 2006, 53% of all suppliers were public companies, the remainder being direct 
municipal suppliers (15%), private companies (12%), official companies, which are 
companies that are not specialized in water and sanitation (13%), mixed companies 
(6%) and authorized organizations (1%).   
The Figure No. 3 shows the hierarchy and how the responsibilities I found in my 
work are distributed among the entities involved in the WSS sector in Colombia.   
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Figure 3. Hierarchy and Structure of the Sector in Colombia 
 
 
Although hierarchy is well established and responsibilities are well delimitated, all 
the stakeholders are supposed to make investments for improving the quality of the 
services and therefore have a budget for it. The scope of investment for each 
institution is blurred and it is possible to obtain sub-optimal investments.  
 
After understanding the context of the sector and the main institutions involved in 
delivering the services in Colombia we are ready to explore in detail the value chain 
and attempt to understand how corruption take place on every step of it. 
D. The Value Chain 
In order to identify the possible corrupt actions that can be committed in the sector, 
the Value Chain for the public services defined by Plummer and Cross (2006) will be 
adapted and used for this project; the presented framework accurately divides the 
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activities from the beginning, when the public policy is made, to the end, when the 
users pay for the service delivered. Figure No. 4 illustrates graphically the mentioned 
structure. 
 
Figure 4. WSS Value Chain 
  
 
 We can attempt to estimate, in overall what percentage of money disappears 
along this chain; this exercise is based on Silva‘s work (2005) who figured out that 
between 1996 and 2003 the Colombian government and other stakeholders involved 
in the sector allocated money to increase service‘s access from 83% to 100% in 
water and 70% to 78% in sanitation, however the access to the mentioned services 
at the end of the period was 88% and 74% respectively (Refer to Figure 6 for graphic 
explanation). Then if we assume that the marginal cost of increasing the service 
access is constant, and linear realtionship between invested resources and service‘s 
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coverage, we can infer that the leaking proportion, which means the money that 
does not reach the final destination, is around 70% on the water services and 50% 
on the sanitation services. These numbers are extremely alarming and should be 
taken as a focusing event to eradicate corruption from the water and sanitation 
sector. The following section will explain in detail how corruption takes place in every 
step of the chain. 
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VI. Analysis: Disentangling the WSS (The Points of Leakage in 
the Corrupt Chain) 
 
Now that the particularities of the sector in Colombia have been clarified and the 
structure being explained, it is important to analyze the possible sources of 
corruption in the provision of the water and sanitation services. For this purpose the 
Plummer and Cross Value Chain is being grouped in three categories according to 
the similarities of the activities of each link. These categories are: i) Political-
Administrative, ii) Management in Contracting Out and iii) Day to Day Management.  
E. Political-Administrative Issues 
This first category is related to the decisions that are made in the political sphere of 
the sector, and that are prone to be manipulated for political reasons or for self 
interest but getting advantage of the political power. This category may look oblivious 
to a casual observer but in reality is serious because with decisions that may seem 
to be insignificant, the citizens are being harmed in the long run and due to those 
decisions the companies have the chance to enjoy an extra profit. As examples of 
this category, we can see tiny increments in services tariffs for the customers, 
politically important regions consistently receiving more support from the government 
(while others not), and local officers misspending the money allocated for the water 
and sanitation sector      
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3. Policy Making and Regulation. 
This is the birth place for the water and sanitation services as a sector;  here, the 
government chooses what to do  and what not to do in order to achieve societal 
goals. Public policymakers evaluate different aspects of water planning and 
management, then derive courses of action to balance interests. This is the starting 
point for possible actions when policymakers are unable to reach a consensus 
regarding a desirable future condition on a certain matter and different groups have 
opposed interests. Then every group will try to maximize its own interest giving room 
for making pressure on the policymaker. 
Ideally, policymaking process should be guided by core principles such as i) 
politicians and public servants are accountable to the public ii) elites, in politics and 
the private sector, do not have the right to pursue their interests without constraints. 
iii) Government bureaucratic and decision processes must be open, accessible, and 
transparent, as well as being responsive to public concerns. iv) Individuals and 
communities affected by projects have the right to information regarding proposed 
developments; the right to challenge the need for, and the design of, projects; and 
the right to be involved in planning and decision-making processes 
Whenever the accomplishment of these and other principles start to be 
compromised, corruption finds a proper environment to take place.  
The other part of this first link of the value chain is the regulation, understood as 
the intervention of the government to correct market failures such as imperfect 
competition, the consequences of externalities and the particularities of certain 
market attributes. The regulatory agency, on behalf of the government, has power to 
control the companies which have market power.  
  
26 
 
 
As mention before since the WSS in Colombia has many stakeholders it is prone 
to receive pressure in different forms from all of them. Figure No. 5 presents the 
external forces that affect and may interfere in the policy making of the ministry in 
charge of it. 
 
Figure.5 Actors representing the external forces that affect the VWS 
 
 
 
   
 It should be clarified that the fact that any particular group tries to have its 
own interest represented in the policy making does not represent a corrupted 
practice, quite the opposite; it makes the process much more participative and 
therefore transparent. Corruption can take place when the agency in this case 
Ministry, created to act in the public interest, instead acts in favor of a certain group 
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or elite and by doing this, affects a group or the whole population the agency was 
suppose to work for. 
 
How does corruption take place in the policy-making process ? 
 
Authorizers: Usually publicly appointed officers, would try to influence the policy 
making process to give preference to the geographical zone where they were 
elected going against the most efficient policy or the benefit of the majority. This kind 
of practices happens as a consequence of the ―cooperation‖ in between the 
executive and legislative branches of the government; when a line ministry needs the 
support of a congress man in a certain bill the congress man would ―charge‖ for the 
collaboration in this manner, practice that is so called ―log-rolling‖ . 
 
Resource Controllers, Technical Supporters and Cooperators: These agencies or 
the public officers belonging to them may work in their own interest to facilitate their 
activities, obtain more power or increment their budget; these interested parties may 
use their political influence to alter the policy making process.  Additionally, the 
public officers can be tempted to use their political power to work on behalf a certain 
interest group, leading to an indirectly capture of the regulator, practice that will be 
explained in the next paragraph.  
 
Interest Groups: Among these groups we have the industry that the government 
regulates and is represented by the companies in charge of delivering the water and 
sanitation sector. They are associated in a guild and can make pressure in a cluster 
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or individually to get some advantage in the policy making, such practice is call the 
regulator capture occurs when a state regulatory agency created to act in the public 
interest instead acts in favor of the interests that dominate in the sector it is in charge 
of regulating. Regulatory capture is a form of government failure, as it can act as an 
encouragement for large firms to produce negative externalities. The main effect of 
this capture is the more favorable conditions for the company, in terms of longer 
periods for concessions, allowance of delivering a lower quality service and higher 
tariffs for the customers. Definitely this represents a zero-sum game where the 
population loses money and the companies enjoy a higher economic surplus.  
 
Stakeholders: Although this a very important group that can make pressure on 
the policy makers the power is reduced and therefore their will does not influence the 
public policies deeply and when it does, it is not in a depraved manner.  
  
2  Corruption in the Planning and Budgeting Process. 
As I have described in the introductory part of the present section, the responsibility 
of the water and sanitation services in Colombia relies on different institutions and so 
is the planning and budgeting. Three dimensions can be clearly identified related to 
this matter; national level, local level (departments and municipalities) and 
environmental authorities‘ level. These groups are independent and autonomous and 
they do their planning activities separately without much coordination among them. 
Their interests are different and sometimes the result of their actions is not leading to 
the same target. However they use the same practices in planning and budgeting.  
By budgeting the government (national or local) allocates the resources to the 
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prioritized needs of the sector; the budget represents the legal authority to spend 
money. Adoption of a budget in the public sector implies that a set of decisions has 
been made by the decision makers that end up matching the government's 
resources and interests with the entity's and public needs. As such, the budget is a 
product of the planning process 
 
How does corruption take place in the planning and budgeting process ? 
 
The main problem in planning and budgeting that opens the door for corruption is 
the directionality that may have the public servants in defining the prioritized needs 
and finding the interests of the public; therefore due to the lack of an objective tool to 
allocate the budget to the most needed plan, as well as the inexistence of 
performance budgeting structures, decision makers are tempted to plan in favor of 
their interests regions and allocate the money, during the planning process, to those 
projects that may represent better political opportunities for them or their 
commanding political party. As a consequence regions or zones with low political 
representation are shortchanged in the allocation of resources and therefore their 
projects are going to be repeatedly postponed even though they represent a real 
priority for them and may be much more important than others in different zones.   
 
3. Fiscal Transfers. 
As explained before, the institutional structure of the WSS in Colombia is based on 
the separated functions between the different government levels. This is how the 
central government is in charge of policy making, regulation, supervision and control 
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while the municipalities are those in charge of guaranteeing the efficient deliverance 
of the water and sanitation services. Since the fiscal revenue in the local level is 
characterized by being low and inefficient, municipalities- particularly small sized 
ones- do not have enough resources to carry out the task assigned by law. Therefore, 
it is necessary for local administration to access to central level resources in order to 
fulfill their mission. For the specific case of the WSS, there are two mechanisms that 
allow central government to transfer resources to the local level with this purpose. 
The first one is direct transfers of money from central level and the second one is 
support for specific projects in a certain municipality. In the next lines I‘ll explain 
possible misbehaviors in the money transfer for the WSS. 
 
How does corruption take place in fiscal transfers? 
 
Money transfer from central Government: Although the law has recently changed, 
the money for the WSS transferred by the central government to the municipalities 
used to come in a found called ―Money for General Purpose‖ and represented 17% 
of the total amount transferred. The scheme is that mayors in municipalities find it 
more politically expedient to divert the resources in projects not related to the WSS, 
such as sport facilities, festivities or city hall‘s renovations. Because of this, evne 
though the central government was allocating money for improving the services 
(especially in low income towns) the citizens were not able to enjoy a better quality 
on them. Misallocation and embezzlement was constant in many of these towns 
leading to service‘s coverage near to 70%. In fact, according to National Planning 
Department (Silva 2005),‖ the vast amount of resources assigned to the WSS should 
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have reflected higher coverage values for the WSS. Additionally the improvement 
has been focused in the urban population, living worse off the inhabitants of the rural 
areas‖.  
The following Figure shows the gap between the actual service in 2003 and that 
that was supposed to be achieved with the money transferred to the municipalities. 
This means that the money representing the difference between the projected and 
real situation has been either misappropriated or used in other non legal practice.   
 
 
Figure 6. Gap between projected and actual coverage (Silva 2005)  
   
Figure  
 
Support for Specific Projects: The second scheme for fiscal transfers occurs 
when the national government shifts funds to support a certain project in favor of 
local politicians. This practice is called ―pork-barrel‖ in which local politicians sell their 
support to the executive branch sponsoring national government initiatives and as 
payback they obtain the support for local projects gaining in this way votes for their 
Water Service 
Sanitation Service 
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reelection campaigns. The problem in this case is that the allocation of those 
resources is not being efficient and may be other communities with lower political 
back up that needed more those resources.  
 
F. Managing in Contracting Out 
Water and Sanitation sector as any other facility based sector needs to extensively 
rely on contracting out, not only for the infrastructure projects building but also for the 
acquisition of goods and services. As it was mentioned before a particularity of this 
sector is the vast amount of money that it handles and this becomes a reason for 
corruption perpetrators to focus their attention on it. This category can be 
responsible for the highest money leakage, where the big money disappears; bid 
rigging and kick backs are common practices leading to over pricing the real value of 
the contracts and stuffing the corrupt people pockets. Therefore, these activities 
should have more attention and control in order to prevent corruption. 
1. Tendering and Procurement 
To be effective, public procurement must be responsive to the demands of the public 
and the government.  A country‘s public procurement system must provide the 
required inputs to the deliverance of public services at low cost and with appropriate 
levels of quality. To achieve this objective, most public procurement systems attempt 
to emulate the operation of the market, primarily by requiring competitive tendering 
procedures for major). A truly competitive process enables the country to effectively 
use public funds or developing infrastructure, promoting human capital, reducing 
poverty, and enhancing economic growth. In order to have an effective public 
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procurement system Ware (2007) gives us the key principles that should govern the 
process: 
 
Figure 7. Public Procurement Principles (Adapted from Ware et al 2007) 
 
 
 
If we were to assure that such principles are followed by the water company, we 
will have transparent and efficient tendering that will lead to fairer prices in the 
service delivered to the community. Unfortunately, the WS sector in Colombia does 
not follow strictly the safeguards described here. There can be identified structural 
problems on the laws and the regulation itself that allow the contractors to take 
advantage of the system; the know better than even the agencies the ways to win 
the tendering and obtain a higher surplus once that the contract has been signed, 
going against the interests of the contracting agency or company and therefore being 
paid by the citizens through the tariff paid by the service. The company‘s economical 
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power and their superior juridical and technical knowledge, allow them to obtain illicit 
benefits without breaking explicitly the laws of the sector. This kind of corruption gets 
advantage from the weaknesses on the spine of the contracting system, out of which 
we can tell the following as the most relevant. 
 
Subjectivity in the ground rules: Ideally the terms of reference should be 
general and impersonal; however the document Riesgos de corrupción en la 
administración pública (Contraloria General del Republica 2007) recognizes as a 
major risk in the sector the tailoring of the terms of reference or their modification 
during the bidding process in order to give competitive advantage to a specific bidder. 
It means that it is possible to have flawless terms of reference that will go in favor of 
a certain bidder which would make other possible competitors to give up on their 
intentions of participating in the bidding process.        
According to the survey made by Programa Probidad (Transparencia 
Colombia 2010)  one third of the businessmen (not only for the WSS) said that one 
of the most repeated corrupt practices is the tailoring of the terms of reference, and 
23% pinpoints the influence on their elaboration. The subjectivity in the ground rules 
ends up making the tendering procedures distrustable. That is how 7 out of 10 
businessmen, said in the mentioned survey, that they desisted in their intentions of 
bidding in public tendering, even though they had the chance of doing it.    
   It is also possible to change the ground rules during the execution of the contract, 
through the modifications of the conditions and technical specifications established in 
the terms of reference, particularly in those aspects that defined the eligibility order. 
Additionally, the lack of strictness in the authorization for the modification of duration 
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and price of certain items, may lead the bidders to submit proposals that they know 
will not be able to honor, with the aim of winning the tendering and afterwards 
requesting the changes during the execution, harming the fair bidders and always 
ending up with a higher price for the contracting agency or company. 
 
Lack of qualification in the public human capital: According to Gomez Pinzon 
Abogados (2007), public servants working in the bidding areas are perceived as 
poorly qualified and with limited knowledge of the applicable laws. Therefore this 
information asymmetry between the contractor and the agency will end up in less 
favorable conditions for the state and its enterprises (SOE), levying the burden on 
the state and opening the door for committing corrupt acts. In the specific case of the 
WSS, contractors can get advantage of the low qualification of the public servants 
during the auditing that these servants do while building the infrastructure project. As 
an example we can have experienced engineers in a specific field, having technical 
discussions with not so experienced ones from the public company, ending up with 
more favorable conditions for the contractor.  
 
Lack of incentives to enhance transparency on the bidders: In the surveys 
related to corruption perception, it is clear that representatives from the private 
sector know or have known, corrupt practices in bidding processes, which leads to a 
number of potential bidders to step away from the tendering done by the public 
sector (Transparencia Colombia 2010). Acknowledging the problem is definitely an 
important step, but there are no incentives to make people report such kind of 
misbehaviors that delegitimize the processes. Additionally it would be beneficial to 
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give some motivational bonuses (for example in the tendering process) to those 
companies that have implemented ethics codes or counter-corruption programs, 
which would make more private companies behaving in an honest way. On the other 
side the punishment for those companies that incur in corrupted actions should be 
much harder, forbidding them to contract with the state during certain period and 
having enough advertising of such companies, which at the same time would help in 
maintaining the perception that the state is not indifferent to corruption.          
 
 Weak control in the bidding process: The duty of the auditing agencies has 
been evaluated in the corruption perception surveys, as poorly effective in preventing 
corruption; being more interested in the form than in the matter (Gomez Pinzon 
Abogados 2007). These kinds of indexes tell that it is necessary to take a look at the 
performance of the Attorney General s´ Office and Public Prosecutor s´ Office in light 
of the surveillance and control they are doing on the contractors in charge of building 
the WSS infrastructure projects. The point is that common sense tells that if a 
contractor commits a corrupt act, it would hardly be punished. Therefore the culture 
of illegality would keep on increasing and corrupt practices will be done more often. 
Regarding the control that can be done by the civil society, it should be said that 
even though the Colombian legislation has enough tools for empowering the civil 
society for this arenas, the lack of technical and financial capacity of the interest 
groups and the weak support given by the citizens make such kind of control 
voiceless in this loud environment.         
After identifying in detail the main failures of the infrastructure contracting system, we 
can attempt to identify different corrupt practices that take advantage of the 
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mentioned weaknesses. 
 
How does corruption take place in tendering and procurement? 
 
 Kickback Facilitator: Kickbacks in large public procurement projects are 
typically negotiated by someone with good connections inside the contracting 
agency; this kind of agent assists the bidder to obtain the bidding documents, submit 
the required financial and technical bid, and attends all meetings relating to the 
tendering. However these agents can also play the role of kickback negotiator In 
corrupt transactions, the agent is compensated for ―capturing‖ the contracting 
agency for the foreign bidder by exerting influence on the local public officials, 
including by arranging and paying kickbacks to them. Usually success fee is given to 
the agent to make him been more interested in winning the contract for the 
represented company. The ability of the contracting agency to detect these illicit 
transactions can be reduced by the fact that the agent shares his part as a bribe with 
the public servant. In fact, the agent is a legalized link in between the bidder and the 
corrupt servant. Even though, the bidding company does not explicit authorize such 
kind of misbehavior to the agent, does not ban it either.  
 
Fraudulent Concession Bidding: In large cities where the water supply duty is 
delegated to private operators, opportunities for fraud can be created by the way the 
contracts are arranged. The private company can get advantage of the concession 
through an unfair negotiation with the public agency in charge getting extra benefits 
from the area and bundle of services, their duration and conditions, the initial 
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capacity can be underestimated, the public assets undervalued, the level and 
process of tariff setting, manipulated, and the targets and subsidies for serving the 
poor determined through public-private deals. 
 
 Bid rigging: This corrupted practice occurs when public tender that is 
supposed to be competitive and fair, is manipulated in such a way that a preselected 
bidder wins the tender. This manipulation takes place among some or all of the 
bidders participating in the tender with or without the knowledge of the public officials 
responsible for conducting the tender, at other times, by coercing some or all of the 
bidders to participate in the bid-rigging scheme (Ware et al 2007). 
 
 Bid withdrawing: One or more potential bidders decide not to bid or are 
coerced by another bidder or a public official. Then a pre-designated bidder wins the 
tendering. In return, the competitors that decided not to participate in the bidding 
receive a payoff from the winning bidder. 
 
 Tailor Designs: The project may, as a result of a bribe, be designed in a 
manner which improperly favors one bidder over the others. For example, a certain 
technology which is only possessed by one of the bidders may be specified, even 
though other technologies may be preferable or cheaper. This would normally result 
in the contractors who do not possess the specified technology being kept off the 
pre-qualification list, or being rejected as non-compliant at tender stage.  
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Artificially Low Proposals: In this case, a pre-designated bidder submits, in 
compliance with the agency, the lowest bid understanding that once awarded, the 
contract will be amended and the prices will be increased in such a way that the 
contractor will inflate his profit margin. A similar practice is the abuse of the ―change 
orders‖ process. In such instances, the winner presents an artificially low proposal 
taking into account that he will make up for the low bid by submitting change orders 
to the contract that change the contract price. 
 
Insufficient Bidding Time and Advertisement: In occasions when the agency 
wants to benefit a specific bidder, sets short bidding periods and does not advertise 
properly the tendering. In this way the agency‘s bidder who already knew the terms 
of reference is the only one able to complete the tendering within the given time. 
 
 Fill up Bidding: Some of the bidders present proposals that do not 
accomplish the requirements of the contracting agency, which makes them lose the 
tendering. In other cases they offer a price extremely high that makes the contracting 
reject the proposal. However the losing bidders have a previous agreement with the 
winning bidder who compensates the actions of the filling up bidders in participating 
in the apparently multi-bidders tendering. These kind of biddings are designed to 
give the appearance of real competition in a public tender but since the winner is 
already pre-established the prices charge to the public agency are much higher than 
those that would be presented in a competitive tendering. 
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 Barriers for bidding: Any potential bidder who wants to win a tendering must 
incur in some expenses related to the preparation of the offer. However, in some 
cases the contracting agency makes this investment extremely high and therefore 
only those bidders that have certainty about winning the contract incur in this money 
and time expenditure. As examples we have tendering fees, charge as the price of 
the terms of reference, which are highly expensive or proposals that include the 
preparation of draft designs and field investigations that unless the bidder has the 
certainty that is going to win the tendering, the company would not incur in those 
huge expenses. The purpose of such practice is to deter the participation of other 
potential bidders and in this way the one that has an agreement with the public 
servants is the only one that is willing to expend this amount of money and therefore 
wins the tendering.   
 
 Bidding Carrousel: With a relatively small number of potential bidders, given 
by the specificity of the project or high bidder requirements given by the agency to 
shrink the group on purpose, the bidders submit bids, but by agreement they take 
turns being the low bidder on a series of related contracts. Again the winner has the 
opportunity of charging higher prices to the agency due to the lack of real 
competition. 
2  Construction 
When construction begins, there is another way of generating illegal profits. The 
profits are generated through change orders, variation orders, or amendments, all of 
which do invariably increase the contract price, give better conditions for the 
contractor. These kinds of variations to the initial terms of reference are changes that 
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are agreed between the contractor and the contracting agency but can be used to 
cover substantial additional quantities or unnecessary services that would be billed 
but not delivered. This approach may be used to enrich a different set of people from 
those involved in the original award. 
Supervisors are another point of vulnerability. Certification by quality assurance 
inspectors, either during implementation or once a work is completed, may be used 
to extract rent from the contractor. On the one hand, materials or quality that does 
not comply with the specifications may be permitted with the complicity of officials, 
who provide such latitude for a price. Field or laboratory test results may be made to 
reflect compliance with specifications even when they failed or the tests were not 
conducted.  
 
How does corruption take place while in construction? 
 
According to Transparency International (Stansbury 2005) any infrastructure 
project during its construction phase is vulnerable to have the following corrupt 
practices:  
―A contractor may pay a bribe to the Owner‘s representative in return for the 
owner issuing a variation which materially increases the contractor‘s scope of 
work. 
 
A contractor may win a contract tender as the lowest priced bidder without 
including a bribe in the contract price, but agree secretly with the owner‘s 
representative that a large variation including a bribe will be agreed at a later 
stage..  
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A contractor may pay a bribe to the architect/engineer in return for the 
architect/engineer issuing a payment certificate or an extension of time to the 
contractor. 
 
A contractor may pay a bribe to the owner‘s quantity surveyor in return for the 
quantity surveyor approving the contractor‘s work schedules and time sheets. 
 
A contractor may pay a bribe to the owner‘s works inspector in return for him 
approving defective or non-existent work. 
 
An owner may pay a bribe to the architect/engineer in return for the 
architect/engineer refraining from issuing a payment certificate or an extension 
of time to the contractor, or for issuing a certificate entitling the deduction of 
liquidated damages from the contractor. 
 
A contractor may submit a claim for payment for a variation to the owner, when 
the contractor knows that, or is reckless as to whether, the amount claimed is 
greater than the amount allowed to the contractor under the contract or by law.  
 
A contractor may make a claim against the owner for an extension of time 
based on an alleged cause for which the owner is responsible, when the 
contractor knows that, or is reckless as to whether, the actual delay was due to 
a cause for which the contractor is responsible  
 
A contractor may submit a loss and expense claim to the Owner based on an 
allegation that the Owner is responsible for a particular event, while concealing 
from the Owner records which would prejudice the contractor‘s claim (e.g. 
letters from the contractor to a sub-contractor which attribute blame for the 
claimed event to the sub-contractor rather than to the Owner). 
 
A contractor may make a claim against the Owner for an extension of time, 
when the contractor knows that, or is reckless as to whether, the claim is for a 
period greater than the actual delay caused to the contractor by the event on 
which the claim is based. 
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A contractor may submit falsified records to support a claim (e.g. false 
programmes, invoices, timesheets etc.) whether or not the claim itself is 
genuine. 
 
Such kind of practice is common to all sectors and is prone to occur in every country, 
and the studied case is not the exception‖ 
 
G. Day to Day Management  
The last category of corruption identified for the water and sanitation sector is the 
one related to operation of the companies in charge of delivering the service. Some 
of these practices are related to the internal management of the company, that even 
though it happens within the company, the users of the services are the ones that 
pay for those inefficiencies derived from this mismanagement. Also, belongs to this 
category what is called as petit corruption which is that one perpetrated by the staff 
in the bottom of the company‘s pyramid, and affects directly the user‘s pocket; even 
though it does not necessary represents an important amount is the one that touches 
more directly the customers.    
 
1. Water Companies Management 
Whether the company in charge of delivering the water and sanitation services is 
public or private, these companies have the privilege of being the monopolistic 
supplier for their geographical region and even though they are regulated they don‘t 
have a perfectly clear incentive of being efficient and transparent. Therefore, if the 
company is public they may have some political incentives and if it is private their 
aim will be profit maximization. In both cases it can be seen the abuse of the power 
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for private gain. Let‘s explore possible scenarios for corruption in the mentioned 
cases 
 
How does corruption take place in day to day management?  
Public Companies: Personal management handling can be blurred; starting from 
the staff hiring, usually is made without any contest and with low requisites, trying to 
give preferentiality to politicians and making these kinds of companies, bureaucratic 
quota for the ruling party. Not only the managerial positions are hired in this way but 
also the middlemen; therefore the staff may have their own agenda fulfilling the 
interests of their ―sponsor‖ that in most of the cases are not aligned with the interests 
of the public, which is the perfect environment for the corruption to take place in all 
the different ways that have been mentioned in this document. 
The same happens to promotions, transfers and salary perks in order to get any 
improvement in the job a certain person most have the approval or protection of a 
political support. What is known as having someone to pull the strings, otherwise it‘s 
going to be difficult for a worker to achieve better positions even though he or she is 
an outstanding professional. This practice makes the company much slower, where 
people don‘t try to work better every day and since compensation comes from the 
people you know and not for the work you do, the inefficiencies arise rapidly. Other 
particularities of these companies is that usually these organizations have excessive 
benefit packages and are overstaffed, as a consequence of continuous creation of 
more positions to receive the recommended people. Since this and other 
inefficiencies are expensive, the company has two options one is raising the price of 
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the tariff charged to the users and the other is undercutting the investments, both of 
them affecting in a higher way the poorer part of the population. 
  
Private Companies: In this case the companies are worried about the efficiency 
of the business therefore they try to have the best qualified personnel the perfect 
size for the company and there is someone that carries the responsibility of higher 
costs in the production of the service, which will become a lower margin for the 
owner of the company. However, what can happen in this case is that the company 
inflates the real incurred cost in order to obtain higher tariff permission from the 
regulator; then the company can over valuate their assets, invest in unnecessary 
projects, report higher operational costs and many other practices in order to take 
advantage of the information asymmetry and cheat the regulator. At the end, the 
company ends up being paid for more of what the company has really spent.           
 
2. Daily Operation  
The particularity of corruption in this link of the value chain is that it takes place within 
the interaction between the users of the WSS and the company employees and 
usually involve a little amount of money but are done frequently and systemically 
(they may be either extortive or collaborative) 
 
How does corruption take place during daily operation?  
 
Common corrupt practices in the service deliverance, operations and 
maintenance of water services, include officials providing illegal connections, with 
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are associated to periodic fees to not cut the water supply or even worse not whist 
blow the action to the supervising authority. Also it is common to find company 
employees selling water to private water vehicles for resale in further zones. Offering 
preferential treatment for repairs and using the company‘s machinery for private gain 
are also among the activities done by corrupted employees and public officers.  
 
Other corrupt practices during the operation are those related to fraud in 
payment systems such as falsifying meter reading, irregular billing, or avoiding 
officials over-charging (Davis, 2003). Typically where poor consumers are involved, 
the bribe is demanded rather than offered.  
 
3. Payment 
The corruption in this last step of the water and sanitation value chain is mostly 
related to the fraud on the payment and/or billing of the service, considering that this 
service is charged by the amount demanded. In the misbehavior, a particular 
customer uses different tricks to pay less than he or she is supposed to, or even 
worse doesn‘t pay anything at all. This practice is done in between a corrupted 
official or company‘s employee and the general public. 
 
How does corruption take place on the payment related issues?  
As explained the amount that has to be paid but the consumers comes from the 
per cubic meter fee, that is imposed by the regulator, and the number of cubic 
meters consumed. Then the fraud comes when the user by its own means or with 
the complicity of the company‘s employee, alters the meter reader in such a way that 
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this measures less volume than the real. Also there are some cases where 
commercial users have to connections intakes; the first one is completely legal with a 
meter that works properly and the other one is a fraudulent connection to the main 
pipeline that steals the water from the company. Other related fraudulent practice is 
given when the company‘s employee, on purpose misreads the meter reporting a 
lower volume of water consumed and therefore a lower bill for the consumer. 
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VII. Summary and Conclusion 
 
No doubt, water and sanitation services are a starting point for reducing poverty, and 
if we are to foster development in those countries of the global south, we should 
assure their effective delivery process. However, despite the efforts made by 
governments and international organizations to reduce poverty by helping those who 
do not have access to these essential services, the situation is alarming; we are still 
talking about billions of people that don‘t have the opportunity to enjoy the most 
basic services and therefore they are in hunger and illness, they don‘t have a chance 
to be educated, women have every day fewer opportunities, child mortality keeps on 
increasing as maternal health is not improving either. This phenomenon seems to be, 
more complicated than the lack of resources, which by itself is important enough; it 
seems to be a matter of use and abuse of the power given to individuals for 
satisfying their own interests. 
 
The Colombian case is not different to the situation previously explained. Even 
though Colombia is a country with immeasurable needs and with limited resources it 
has made a heroic effort to bring the water and sanitation services to the population, 
especially those in poorer conditions. But regardless of the investment level and the 
commitment of some of its governors, the actual scenario is not so encouraging. 
Understanding the relevance of this issue, money has been constantly allocated to 
improve the quality of these services but no matter how much money is allocated to 
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the sector, the actual amount of money distributed at the end of the pipelines are 
minuscule and they dissipate in the long chain of the administrative and 
management process.  
 
In this study I have described the complexity of the water and sanitation sector, its 
particularities in Colombia and the variety and creativity of human beings for 
committing corrupt actions. I have shown that corruption takes place in every step of 
the collusive chain, where larger parts are taken in specific parts, but none of the 
activities in the water and sanitation sector is immune to this illness, as corruption 
was compared to in this paper.  
 
In my view, the resolution of this entrenched corrupt system lies squarely in top 
leadership. The policy makers may need to establish a Czar who is given authority to 
investigate every step in the corruption chain as I have described and stream line the 
regulatory and enforcement armed with sanctions and rewards. Enough resources 
are needed to assure that this office is going to be strong enough to detect corrupt 
actions and therefore will make people think twice before getting involved in this 
misbehavior. Additionally the civil society should be involved in the whole process, 
but again the government cooperation and willingness to empower citizens is 
indispensable, starting with information disclosure, letting the people know what is 
needed to do, how is it going to be done and how much will be spent on it, passing 
through the people qualification to make sure that they can understand the 
regulations that all stakeholders involved in the value chain should follow and finally 
giving them the tools to make their control duty. 
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A strong work with civil servants, at all levels, is required in order to control this 
source of corruption. First they should receive ethical qualifications through 
workshops in order to make them understand the damage it can cause on the 
society. Through these kinds of activities civil servants are going to start judging 
corruption as perverse practice and the ethical environment of the organization is 
going to experience a change; unless everyone agrees that corruption should be 
abolished, this misbehavior will be in the organization forever. Another action 
required, is to align the interest of the civil servants with those of the organization, 
then it is necessary to implement rewards/penalties scheme for everyone in the 
organization; these should be especially targeted to eradicate corruption and 
incentive transparency during the activities required to deliver the water and 
sanitation services.    
 
The establishment of systems -as quality assurances programs- and processes is 
indispensable to avoid corruption; diminishing the discretionary power of middlemen 
and shutting down all the opportunities that may act as temptation for public servants 
to commit these actions.  
 
Finally it is necessary that policy makers understand the structure of corruption 
and identify where the resources are leaking and the way it is happening. In order to 
control this negative practice, policy makers must identify the locus of corruption in 
the political economy of water and sanitation and scrutinize how the budgetary 
resources are dissipating through the corrupt chain. This understanding added to a 
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titanic commitment for controlling corruption, punishing the corrupt ones and 
enlightening the people in charge of decision making would be a way to start 
containing the corruption in the water and sanitation sector.  
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